This paper provides an extension of general equilibrium theory that incorporates the actions of individuals both as demanders and suppliers of goods and as members of ...rms, schools, social groups, and contractual relationships. The central notion of the paper is a group: a collection of individuals associated with one another for some purpose. The model takes as primitive an exogenous set of ...

Coordination between agents can be modelled using correlated equilibrium and a ‘device’ allocating roles to players. That coordination takes place within a social context suggests properties that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium. In this paper, given a partition of the player set into (social) groups, we demonstrate the existence of an approximate correlated equilibrium satisfying a w...

Considerable attention has been devoted to the evolution of social networks through time. Some has been descriptive, some has sought fundamental principles for studying network evolution and some has been analytical. The work described in this paper represents all three approaches and is cast within the framework of rational choice theory. One foundation is found in the work of Jackson and Woli...

Every atom in universe exists in equilibrium of different physical forces. Everyone in society lives in equilibrium of their work and family, of their enthusiasm and reality. Equilibrium is one of the main notions in Game Theory — the domain studies behaviors of entities according to their own interests. The conflicting interests, the lack of coordination and regulation may not lead a game to a...

We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel identical links, to control the routing of its own assigned traffic. In a Nash equilibrium, each user selfishly routes its traffic on those links that minimize its expected latency cost. T...

We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium [5]. We assume that players in a strategic game are embedded in a social network, and there are coordination constraints that restrict the potential coalitions t...

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a reinforcement learning (adaptive filtering) algorithm that facilitates learning an equilibrium by resorting to diffusion cooperation strategies in a social ...

We study the combinatorial structure and computational complexity of extreme Nash equilibria, ones that maximize or minimize a certain objective function, in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel links, to control the routing of its own assigned traffic. In a Na...

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose with whom they play. A group of players who are dissatisfied with the play of their current partners can join together and play a new equilibrium. This imposes new refinements on equilibrium play, where play depends on the relative populations of players in different roles, amon...