نتایج جستجو برای: reputation risk jel classification g14

تعداد نتایج: 1420214  

Journal: :تحقیقات اقتصادی 0
شاپور محمدی استادیار دانشکده‎ی مدیریت دانشگاه تهران حامد طبسی دانشجوی دکتری مدیریت مالی دانشکده‎ی مدیریت دانشگاه تهران

in this paper using catastrophe theory, we investigate non-smooth changes in tehran stock exchange. stock market crashes bring not only panic among investors, but also in deeper market lead to recession and decrease in consumer's confidence. as catastrophe theory is strong tool in explaining nonlinear phenomena, by applying stochastic cusp catastrophe model we examine sudden change in tehr...

Journal: :تحقیقات اقتصادی 0
غلامرضا کشاورز دانشیار دانشگاه صنعتی شریف هادی حیدری پژوهش‎گر اقتصاد، فارغ التحصیل دانشگاه صنعتی شریف

this paper examines the impact of 2005 presidential election of iran on the tehran stock exchange volatility as a political shock. it uses garch family (fiegarch, egarch, and garch) and markov regime switching (mrs) models as the analytical frameworks for the main the stock daily prices index. our findings confirm statistical validity of arima – fiegarch-x and ar(1) mrs as appropriate specifica...

Journal: :تحقیقات اقتصادی 0
جعفر عبادی دانشیار دانشکدة اقتصاد دانشگاه تهران

the purpose of this article is the measurement of technical efficiency and returns to scale using data envelopment (dea) approach. in this study, we have measured efficiency quantity and economies of scale for state owned insurance and private companies for 1384-1385 periods. the results reveal that in the dea with the assumption of variable returns to scale, iran, tosee and razi companies have...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2009
Dirk Engelmann Urs Fischbacher

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity ex...

Journal: :Management Science 2012
Thomas H. Noe Michael Rebello Thomas A. Rietz

We show that introducing an external capital market with information asymmetry into a product market model reduces opportunistic substitution of sub-standard goods and encourages producers to concentrate on long-run reputation building. We test this result with a laboratory experiment. We find that, when the problem of product market opportunism is moderate, i.e., reputation formation equilibri...

2015
John Cotter Merrill Lynch

This study evaluates the effectiveness of geographic diversification in reducing housing investment risk. To characterize diversification potential, we estimate spatial correlation and integration among 401 U.S. metropolitan housing markets. The 2000s boom brought a marked uptrend in housing market integration associated with eased residential lending standards and rapid growth in private mortg...

2012
W. Bentley MacLeod Miguel Urquiola Maria Marta Ferreyra Roland Fryer

Anti-Lemons: School Reputation, Relative Diversity, and Educational Quality Friedman (1962) observed that the ability of firms to acquire and maintain reputations for quality is a key ingredient for the efficient provision of goods and services in a market economy. This paper explores the implications of school reputation for skill acquisition and labor market outcomes in an otherwise competiti...

Journal: :Mathematical Social Sciences 2013
Daniel F. Stone Steven J. Miller

We analyze a game theoretic model of social learning about a consumption good with endogenous timing and heterogeneous accuracy of private information. We show that if individuals value their reputation for the degree to which they are informed, this reduces the incentive to learn by observing others and exacerbates the incentive to consume the good before others, i.e., to attempt to be an “opi...

2017
Felipe Varas Iván Marinovic Andrzej Skrzypacz

This paper studies the design of monitoring policies in dynamic settings with moral hazard. The firm benefits from having a reputation for quality, and the principal can learn the firm’s quality by conducting costly inspections. Monitoring plays two roles: An incentive role, because the outcome of inspections affects the firm’s reputation, and an informational role because the principal values ...

1999
Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Equilibrium search models obtained endogenous wage differentials among identical firms and workers based on the equal profit assumption. We formulate a more fundamentally dynamic game with identical players where workers can strategically quit and firms cannot commit to future wages, and find that equilibrium wage differentials arise due to different worker expectations on the firms’ future beh...

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