Voter turnout is considered the “canary in the coal mine” when it comes to assessing the health of civic participation in a democracy; low turnout in particular is indicative of broader problems. Although voter turnout is quite high in both Sweden and Finland, turnout is notably higher in Sweden despite a long list of similarities between the two countries. Why is there this puzzling discrepanc...

Recently, many e-voting systems have been proposed for successful election. It should be satisfied many requirements for successful e-voting. In this paper, we propose the ballot-cancellation scheme in order to manage invalid ballots. Many proposed e-voting systems have been proposed without considering invalid ballots. It can be happened an invalid ballot during e-voting, and then we should co...

We describe information security requirements for a secure and functional Internet voting scheme. Then we present the voting scheme with multiple parties; this voting scheme satisfies all these security requirements. In this scheme, the voter gets a signed key from the registrar, where the registrar signs the key as blinded. The voter uses this signed key during the voting period. All other par...

Many electronic voting protocols assume the voter votes with some computing device. This raises the question whether a voter can trust the device he is using. Three years ago, Chaum, and independently Neff, proposed what we call bare-handed electronic voting, where voters do not need any computational power in the voting booth. Their protocols have a strong unforgeability guarantee. The price f...

Referendums provide citizen control over policy outcomes under various institutional provisions. This article offers a theoretical model covering four types of referendums, which differ with respect to their likelihood of occurring and their policy consequences. Implications derived from this model suggest that provisions that allow an opposition group to propose policies to be adopted by refer...

In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition. This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include ``a minimally rich domain.'' We first characterize generalized median voter schemes as the unique class of strategy-proof...

The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimen sional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial cons...

Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries to affect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win (constructive control) or lose (destructive control) the election. We study the constructive and destructive voter control problems when adding and deleting voters have a c...