We study unbiased Maker-Breaker positional games played on the edges of the random graph G(n, p). As the main result of the paper, we prove a conjecture from [18], that the property that Maker is able to win the Hamiltonicity game played on a random graph G(n, p) has a sharp threshold at log n n . Our theorem can be considered a game-theoretic strengthening of classical results from the theory ...

We study the following Maker/Breaker game. Maker and Breaker take turns in choosing vertices from a given n-uniform hypergraph F , with Maker going first. Maker’s goal is to completely occupy a hyperedge and Breaker tries to avoid this. Beck conjectures that if the maximum neighborhood size of F is at most 2 then Breaker has a winning strategy. We disprove this conjecture by establishing an n-u...

Many real-world optimization problems have several, usually conflicting objectives. Evolutionary multi-objective optimization usually solves this predicament by searching for the whole Pareto-optimal front of solutions, and relies on a decision maker to finally select a single solution. However, in particular if the number of objectives is large, the number of Pareto-optimal solutions may be hu...

We have developed a portable and easily configurable genome annotation pipeline called MAKER. Its purpose is to allow investigators to independently annotate eukaryotic genomes and create genome databases. MAKER identifies repeats, aligns ESTs and proteins to a genome, produces ab initio gene predictions, and automatically synthesizes these data into gene annotations having evidence-based quali...

Abstract Nowadays among many evaluation methods, data envelopment analysis has widely used to evaluate the relative performance of a set of Decision Making Units (DMUs). Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA(is a mathematical tool for evaluating the relative efficiency of a set Decision Making Units (DMUs), with multiple inputs and outputs. Traditional DEA models treat with each DMU as a “black box" t...

We study optimal contracts between a decision maker and an expert where the decision maker can commit to make transfers to the expert contingent on his advice but cannot commit to take an action contingent on advice. We show that optimal contracts never entail full revelation. Instead, the decision maker pays the expert to reveal for some states and doesn’t compensate the expert at all in other...

It's hard to imagine a software agent that could cause physical harm to anyone -it's only software, after all. But what if that software is controlling an electrical appliance, say a coffee maker? Could a control failure cause the coffee maker to overheat and start a fire? We hope not; the coffee maker should in any case have passed an Underwriters' Laboratory test to assure that it won't start...