This book presents the achievements in research of a special underactuated system called mobile wheeled inverted pendulum (MWIP) over recent years. Taking dynamic modeling, control, and simulation as mainline, this first introduces particularity, control challenges, applications MWIP system. The Lagrange function is adopted to model dynamics two-dimensional three-dimensional systems. Based on d...

Within half a century hospitals for children had become established features of the British medical landscape. By 1900, the formerly entrenched notion that sick children would not prosper away from home had given way to the other extreme. Now, it would seem, children required to be isolated in institutions entirely dedicated to their care. As Roger Cooter has indicated, there was a 'gradual dis...

This paper considers a general class of two-sided many-to-one matching markets, so-called matching markets with contracts. We study the blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for this class of matching markets. We first show that the blocking lemma for matching with contracts holds if hospitals’ choice functions satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. The blocking lemma f...

The sponsored search auction problem was introduced briefly as an example in Chapter 1. In this chapter, we study this problem in more detail to illustrate a compelling application of mechanism design. We first describe a framework to model this problem as a mechanism design problem under a reasonable set of assumptions. Using this framework, we describe three well known mechanisms for sponsore...

This paper explores Thompson sampling in the context of mechanism design for stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems. The setting is that of an MAB problem where the reward distribution of each arm consists of a stochastic component as well as a strategic component. Many existing MAB mechanisms use upper confidence bound (UCB) based algorithms for learning the parameters of the reward dist...

We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixedstrategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It is shown that, in economic environments with at least three agents, mixed Bayesian implementation is e...

Mechanism Design is concerned with how to implement system wide solutions to problems that involve multiple self-interested agents, each with private information about their preferences. Mechanism Design Optimization Problem is a mechanism design problem where the output specification is given by a positive real valued objective function and a set of feasible outputs, and we require an output t...

This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for combinatorial auctions, we must consider the possibility of a ne...

Though Walvoord and McCarthy are the authors of this chapter, all team members have had input, and the chapter is based on the entire team's study. Thus "we" in this chapter refers to the team as a whole. We summarized some of our findings in Chapter 1 as a way of helping readers prepare for the classroom chapters. In this chapter, we complete that summary and we discuss implications of our stu...