We show that for generic economies, every equilibrium admits Pareto improving monetary policy, even with multiple commodities per state. The main assumption is that asset incompleteness be intermediate, in that household heterogeneity does not exceed the number of assets present and absent. We argue this as a special case of the general framework in Turner (2003b) for proving the generic existe...

We provide easily-verifiable sufficient conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game to guarantee the existence of a behavioral-strategy Bayes–Nash equilibrium. We allow players’ payoff functions to be discontinuous in actions, and illustrate the usefulness of our results via an example of an all-pay auction with general tie-breaking rules which cannot be handled by extant results. © 2015 El...

Considerable prior analysis has gone into the study of zoning restrictions on locational choice and on fiscal burdens, but none addresses the level and distribution of public goods provided under fiscal zoning. Our analysis emphasizes the interplay between land use restrictions and public good provision, focusing on schooling outcomes. We extend existing general equilibrium models of location a...

Samuelson (1947) stated that a regular equilibrium exhibits the transfer paradox if and only if it is unstable. Gale (1974) and many in the early 1980’s debunked this equivalence by adding extra countries, reaching an anti consensus. We reinterpret Samuelson’s result as identifying the threshold, i.e. the minimum level of trade beyond which the transfer paradox appears. This reinterpretation ge...

Fully rational agents are allowed to optimize over expectations formation technologies in an environment where it is costly to collect and process information. It is shown in a general equilibrium framework that optimization over expectations by rational and forward oriented agents can lead to endogenous instability. Specifically, we illustrate that resulting equilibria can be both chaotic and ...

We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We then identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the...

This paper introduces and studies the γ-core of a general strategic game. It shows that a prominent class of games admit nonempty γ-cores. It also shows that the γ-core payoff vectors (a cooperative solution concept) can be supported as equilibrium outcomes of a non-cooperative game and the grand coalition is the unique equilibrium outcome if and only if the γ-core is nonempty. As an applicatio...

There are two distinct “Scandinavian consensus” approaches to public good supply, both based on agents’ willingness to pay. A Wicksell–Foley public competitive equilibrium arises from a negative consensus in which no change of public environment, together with associated taxes and subsidies which finance it, will be unanimously approved. Alternatively, in a Lindahl or valuation equilibrium, cha...

Many workers hear about or obtain their jobs through friends and relatives. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we relate both individual and aggregate labor market outcomes to the network structure of personal contacts. Second, we study strategic network formation. To this purpose, we develop a model specifying at the individual level both the decision to form contacts with other agents, ...

In this paper, we explore the dynamic properties of an endogenous growth model with finite patent length. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium growth path and that this path exhibits damped oscillations in contrast to the equilibrium path of an endogenous growth model with infinite patent length.We also examine the effects of patent policy on social welfare and show that infinite pate...