Using techniques from evolutionary game theory, we analyze potential games with continuous player sets, a class of games which includes a general model of network congestion as a special case. We concisely characterize both the complete set of Nash equilibria and the set of equilibria which are robust against small disturbances of aggregate behavior. We provide a strong evolutionary justificati...

The field of study of the PhD position offered is Computer Games (CG) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in general. More precisely the games studied are zero-sum two-player complete information games with a high complexity such as Go, Amazons or Shogi. In addition to Tree Search (TS) and knowledge-based techniques, the technique newly used in the computer Go community is Monte-Carlo (MC) [5]. Th...

Evolutionary processes based on two-player games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma or Snowdrift Game are abundant in evolutionary game theory. These processes, including those based on games with more than two strategies, have been studied extensively under the assumption that selection is weak. However, games involving more than two players have not received the same level of attention. To addres...

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of replicator dynamic but not every attractor is an ESS. We search for a dynamic characterization of ESSs in quantum games and find that in certain asymmetric bi-matrix games evolutionary ...

We have proposed two new evolutionary rules on spatio-iterated games that is not mimic evolution of strategies, and mainly discussed the Prisoner’s Dilemma game [10] by the two evoutionary rules [11]. In this paper we focus the first rule, that is, the selfish evolutionary rule for various dilemma games. In contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there are gererally rich pase structures in the dile...

Karl Sigmund is professor at the faculty of mathematics of the University of Vienna, and also works at the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg. He studied mathematics and worked on dynamical systems before turning to population genetics, theoretical ecology and evolutionary game theory. He wrote a popular book on ‘Games of Life’ (Penguin, 1994) and, jointly with Josef Hofbauer, ...

An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was originally defined as a static concept but later given a dynamic characterization. A well known theorem in evolutionary game theory says that an ESS is an attractor of replicator dynamics but not every attractor is an ESS. We search for a dynamic characterization of ESSs in quantum games and find that in certain asymmetric bi-matrix games evolutionary...

It was known that cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games fails to emerge in homogenous networks such as random graphs. Here we proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game. The game consists of two players, in which each player has three choices of strategy: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q). We found that quantum entanglement guarantees emergence of a...

Unlike evolutionary dynamics, co-evolutionary dynamics can exhibit a wide variety of complex regimes. This has been confirmed by numerical studies e.g. in the context of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) and population dynamics of simple two-strategy games with various types of replication and selection mechanisms. Using the framework of shadowing lemma we study to what degree can such infinite po...

Artificially intelligent opponents in commercial computer games are almost exclusively controlled by manuallydesigned scripts. With increasing game complexity, the scripts tend to become quite complex too. As a consequence they often contain “holes” that can be exploited by the human player. The research question addressed in this paper reads: How can evolutionary learning techniques be applied...