What follows is propaganda for the study of a particular commutative Banach algebra, A one not inappropriate to a conference which emphasises automatic continuity. In fact A is that subalgebra of the measure algebra, .i\J(T), of all regular bounded Borel measures on the circle under the total variation norm and convolution multiplication, which is characterised by the automatic continuity of me...

135 Despite the importance of this issue, not much systematic research appears to have been devoted to assessing the relative susceptibility of national and local governments to interestgroup capture. Here we describe a model of two-party electoral competition with “probabilistic” voting behavior and lobbying by specialinterest groups based on David Baron (1994) and Gene Grossman and Elhanan He...

Polarization has been always identified as a problem for Latin American democracies. Yet its determinants remain largely undertheorized and without systematic evidence. This paper tackles this shortcoming with a new explanation where polarization is conceptualized as a mobilizational tool used by parties to deliver unequivocal signals to voters about their location in the policy space. The expl...

The collapse of the traditional social ties, the advance of the mass media and the advent of political marketing have altered the structure and the direction of electoral campaigns. Present-day media-mediated electoral campaigns are hotly debated. On one side are those who claim that campaigns simplify political reality, manipulate voters, encourage voting apathy and in the long run contribute ...

In this paper we argue that institutional changes to the seniority system have electoral consequences to incumbents. Building on the theory of Conditional Party Government, we argue that the consolidation of power in the hands of party leadership reduces the electoral value of seniority. This reduction occurs because power that was previously in the hands of committee chairs, whose roles are ob...

The principle of democracy is that the people govern through elected representatives. Therefore, a democracy is healthy as long as the elected politicians do represent the people. We have analyzed data from the Brazilian electoral court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE) concerning money donations for the electoral campaigns and the election results. Our work points to two disturbing conclusion...

This paper examines electoral accountability after the 2009-10 UK expenses scandal. Existing research shows that Members of Parliament (MPs) implicated in the scandal fared only marginally worse in the election than non-implicated colleagues. This lack of electoral accountability for misconduct could have arisen either because voters did not know about their representative's wrongdoing or becau...

Dominant theories of electoral behavior emphasize that voters myopically evaluate policy performance and that this shortsightedness may obstruct the welfare-improving effect of democratic accountability. However, we know little about how long governments receive electoral credit for beneficial policies. We exploit the massive policy response to a major natural disaster, the 2002 Elbe flooding i...

The existing empirical literature in comparative politics holds that social cleavages affect the number of candidates or parties when electoral institutions are “permissive.” However, this literature lacks a theoretical account of the strategic candidate entry and exit decisions that ultimately determine electoral coalitions under different institutions in plural societies. This paper incorpora...

Early research led scholars to believe that institutional accountability in Congress is lacking because public evaluations of its collective performance do not affect the reelection of its members. However, a changed partisan environment along with new empirical evidence raises unanswered questions about the effect of congressional performance on incumbents’ electoral outcomes over time. Analys...