We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.

With the fast growing traffic of the ubiquitous mobile devices, the demands for available radio spectrum resources are increasing rapidly. Unfortunately, many new spectrum demanders cannot access the limited spectrum licensees in time while a large pool of spectrum resources are extremely underutilized. Auction has been regarded as one of the promising methods for the scarce resources allocatio...

There has been an extensive research literature on auctions, but recent developments in technology have resulted in new interest in auction mechanisms as a practical way of allocating resources. This paper presents a new double-auction mechanism to handle resource allocation for public goods when complementarity exists. The mechanism is placed in the context of an organization’s internal knowle...

This paper demonstrates the potential role of autonomous agents in economic theory. We first dispatch autonomous agents, built by genetic programming, to double auction markets. We then study the bargaining strategies, discovered by them, and from there, an autonomous-agent-inspired economic theory with regard to the optimal procrastination is derived.

In this paper, we simulate the double auction markets with AIE-DA Ver. 2. Given that all traders are truth tellers and non-adaptive, we find that the GP trader can always find the most profitable trading strategies. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the trading strategies discovered by GP are very market-specific, which makes our artificial bargaining agent behave quite intelligently.

1.1 INTRODUCTION Empirical research of online auctions has been growing steadily in the last several years. Online auctions are different from offline auctions in several important ways: They are usually much longer, bidders and sellers are anonymous, and the barriers of entry are much lower for both bidders and sellers. These differences lead to auction dynamics that can be very different from...

Double auctions play a pivotal role in stimulating active participation of large number users comprising both task requesters and workers mobile crowdsourcing. However, most existing studies have concentrated on designing offline two-sided auction mechanisms supporting single-type tasks fixed service models. Such works ignore the need dynamic services are unsuitable for large-scale crowdsourcin...

Owing to energy liberalization and increasing penetration of renewables, renewable trading among suppliers users has gained much attention created a new market. This article investigates double-auction scheme operated by an aggregator with limited supervision for trading. To ensure beneficial bidding generators end (EUs) considered as agents, multiagent Q-learning (MAQL) based strategy is devel...

Auctions and exchanges are one of the most important market mechanisms for price determination and allocation of goods. In this paper we consider the case when each buyer has a limited budget and wishes to buy at most one item in multi-item auctions. We show the limitations of two known mechanisms { sequence of single-item auctions and recently introduced XOR double auctions { and introduce a n...