This paper suggests “soft debt” as a social convention that facilitates long-term reciprocal relationships. In each round of a two-player repeated game, one player develops a need for help from his counterpart, who may or may not be able to help. If help is rendered, a soft debt is tacitly accrued by him to his counterpart and added to the soft debt balance between them. The roles of potential ...

Building on the Mauer and Sarker (2005) model that captures both investment flexibility and optimal capital structure and risky debt, we study the impact of debt financing constraints on firm value, the optimal timing of investment and other important variables like the credit spreads. The importance of debt financing constraints on firm value and investment policy depends largely on the relati...

Since corporate debt tends to be riskier in recessions, transfers from equity holders to debt holders that accompany corporate decisions also tend to concentrate in recessions. Such systematic risk exposures of debt overhang have important implications for corporate investment and financing decisions, and for the ex ante costs of debt overhang. Using a calibrated dynamic capital structure model...

the aim of this empirical study is to explore the trade-off model and pecking order model of capital structure. the investigation is performed using panel data procedures for a sample of 76 firms listed in tehran stock exchange during 2007-2010.the study employs ols regression model in examining the capital structure of firms in iran. the study employs variables reflecting differing theoretical...

In this paper, we present an intensity-based common factor model that is used to analyze the valuation of common systematic risks in multi-name credit and equity markets. In particular, we use a hybrid intensity model to price single-name credit instruments such as credit default swaps (CDSs), multi-name credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and equity index options...

We consider a model in which a principal must both repay a loan and motivate an agent to work hard. Output is non-contractible, so the principal faces a commitment problem with both her creditor and her agent. In a profit-maximizing equilibrium, the agent’s productivity is initially low and increases over time. Productivity continues increasing even after the debt has been repaid, eventually co...

We propose a clientele-based theory of the optimal maturity structure of government debt. We assume a three-period economy in which clienteles correspond to generations of agents consuming in different periods. An optimal maturity structure exists even in the absence of distortionary taxes, and consists in the government replicating the actions of private agents not yet present in the market. T...

This paper argues that credit frictions and asset trading costs signi cantly increase the probability of a Sudden Stop in the early stages of nancial globalization, and that this in turn, signi cantly alters the long-run external capital structure of emerging market economies. Upon opening the capital account, domestic agents have an incentive to accumulate debt and sell domestic equity in orde...

This paper explores the leverage determinants across firms’ sizesbased on the two main theories behind the capital structure, the trade-offand the pecking order theories. A panel data is sued to find therelationship between capital structure and the variables that proxy forbenefits and costs of debt during 1990 to 2006. Our findings show thatboth principles help to explain the capital structure...