Most developed countries allocate radio spectrum by auction. The Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has proven to work well for this application. Recently, new designs that allow package bidding have been proposed. These designs have only been tried in the past few years. We first provide some historical background regarding the allocation of spectrum, describe the use of the SAA design and i...

This paper describes an iterative combinatorial auction for single-minded bidders that offers modularity in the choice of price structure, drawing on ideas from kernel methods and the primal-dual paradigm of auction design. In our implementation, the auction is able to automatically detect, as the rounds progress, whether price expressiveness must be increased to clear the market. The auction a...

This paper conducts a literature review on freight transport service procurements (FTSP) and explores the application of combinatorial auctions (CAs) mechanism mathematical modeling approach associated problems. It provides an overview problems their solution strategies. The results demonstrate that there has been limited scholarly attention to sustainable issues, risk mitigation stochastic nat...

Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, in order for mixed auctions to be effectively applied to supply chain formation, we must ensure computational tractability and reduce bidders’ uncertainty. With this aim, we introduce Sequential Mixed Auctions (SMAs), a novel auction model concei...

Full terms and conditions of use:

Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are a great way to solve complex resource allocation and coordination problems. However, CAs require a central auctioneer who receives the bids and solves the winner determination problem, an NP-hard problem. Unfortunately, a centralized auction is not a good fit for real world situations where the participants have proprietary interests that they wish to remain pri...

Combinatorial auctions, one of the most popular market mechanisms, have a huge effect on electronic markets and political strategies. Combinatorial auctions provide suitable mechanisms for efficient allocation of resources to self-interested attendees. On the other hand, efficient resource allocation is also becoming crucial in many computer systems that should manage resources efficiently. Con...

Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cann...