نتایج جستجو برای: c78

تعداد نتایج: 602  

2014
Tore Ellingsen Elena Paltseva

If people are free to contract, will outcomes be efficient? We study the question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. With mandatory participation, efficiency is attaina...

2006
Klaus Kultti

I study an economy with sellers and buyers with unit supplies and unit demands. Both parties have valuations uniformly distributed on a unit interval. I quantify the inefficiency, compared to the Walrasian market, caused by a market where the agents meet randomly. There are several causes of inefficiency that I deal with separately. First, even if there is perfect information about valuations i...

2009
Serkan Küçükşenel

This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-toone matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. With an unrestricted domain of preferences the non-emptiness of the core is not guaranteed. We present a sequential mechanism implementing the core without any restr...

1998
Gary E. Bolton Elena Katok

Field evidence suggests that arbitration increases negotiation dispute rates. We study repeated bargaining in a laboratory to understand the reasons why. Our results represent a reinterpretation of an explanation known as the narcotic effect. The standard interpretation assumes that the probability of dispute without arbitration is constant across negotiations, but field evidence suggests that ...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2017
Luisa Herbst Kai A. Konrad Florian Morath

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. E...

2017
John William Hatfield Scott Duke Kominers Michael Ostrovsky

Various forms of substitutability are essential for establishing the existence of equilibria and other useful properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier models’ definitions of substitutability to settings in which each agent can be both a buyer in some transactions and a seller in others, and show that all these de...

Journal: :Social Choice and Welfare 2002
Nir Dagan Oscar Volij Eyal Winter

We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom. JEL Classification, C72, C78. ∗We thank Marco Mariotti, two anonymous referees and an ...

Journal: :Symmetry 2022

Fullerene is a cage-like carbon allotrope admitting vast range of applications. Some the important fullerenes are C54,C58,C60,C70,C74,C76,C78,C80C82,C84,C86,C90. The physical properties can be exhibited using degree-based topological indices. sum based geometric arithmetic index significant in this manner. atomic bond connectivity, Randic, first and second Zagreb indices well known We have dete...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2008
Tri Vi Dang

This paper analyses information acquisition in ultimatum bargaining with common values. Because of an endogenous lemons problem the equilibriumpayoffs of the agents are non-monotonic in the information cost. The mere possibility of information acquisition can cause no trade although the agents maintain symmetric information in equilibrium and the gain from trade is common knowledge. The agent r...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2008
Helmuts Azacis

I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envyfree with respect to the agents’ true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with re...

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