We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to capture in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socio-economic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, and each agent’s choice might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study s...

We consider an agent-based model of financial markets with asynchronous order arrival in continuous time. Buying and seeling orders arrive in accordance with a Poisson dynamics where the order rates depend both on past prices and the mood of the market. The agents form their demand for an asset on the basis of their forecasts of future prices and where their forecasting rules may change over ti...

AND EQUILIBRIA Reinoud JOOSTEN May 1994 MERIT Research Memorandum 2/94-016 MERIT Research Memoranda can be ordered from the address below, or be obtained in electronic form (Postscript) by anonymous ftp at meritbbs.rulimburg.nl Abstract Weakly compatible population dynamics describe changes in the composition of a population in a competitive environment, driven by differences in fitness levels ...

We present a model of the behavior of an industry in perfect competition. A new feature in the modeling is the consumers’ role in the evolution of the industry. We show a link in between market behavior and economic growth at industry level. Growth may occur due to increases in technology or consumers’ wealth, due to a positive change in consumers’ preferences concerning this good or increasing...

In two-sided matching markets with contracts, the existence of stable outcomes can be guaranteed only under certain restrictions on preferences; the typical restriction is that all agents’ preferences are substitutable. We show that, in markets with a continuum of each type of agent, it is only necessary that agents on one side of the market have substitutable preferences to guarantee the exist...

This paper studies the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for nonatomic games where players take actions in an infinite-dimensional Banach space. For any infinitedimensional Banach space, we construct a nonatomic game with actions in this space which has no pure-strategy Nash equilibria, provided that the player space is modeled by the usual Lebesgue unit interval. We also show that if ...

We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we obtain as a corollary the “lone wolf” theorem and a decomposability result. The latter result together with transitivity of blocking ...

The paper examines an R&D model with uncertainty from the population growth, which is a stochastic cooperative Lotka-Volterra system, and obtains a sufficiently condition for the existence of the globally positive solution. The long-run growth rate of the economic system is ultimately bounded in mean and fluctuation of its growth will not be faster than the polynomial growth. When uncertainty o...

Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) investigate a stochastic evolutionary model for extensive form games and show that even for games of perfect information with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, non-subgame perfect equilibrium-strategies may well survive in the long run even when mutation rates tend to zero. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of these games Hart (2002) sho...

We analyze a class of imitation dynamics with mutations for games with any …nite number of actions, and give conditions for the selection of a unique equilibrium as the mutation rate becomes small and the population becomes large. Our results cover the multiple-action extensions of the aspiration-andimitation process of Binmore and Samuelson [3] and the related processes proposed by Benaïm and ...