Job Search with Bidder Memories This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, t...

In this paper, we develop a model of collusion in which two firms play an infinitelyrepeated Bertrand game when each firm has a privately-informed agent. The colluding firms, fixing prices, allocate market shares based on the agent’s information as to cost types. We emphasize that the presence of privately-informed agents may provide firms with a strategic opportunity to exploit an interaction ...

We show that the value of commitment in many standard games is fragile. Specifically, when the second mover faces a small cost to observe the first mover’s action, equilibrium payoffs are identical to the case where observation is infinitely costly or the first mover’s actions are completely unobservable. Applications of our result include standard Stackelberg-Cournot and differentiated product...

We consider a competitive version of the traditional aggregate production planning model with capacity constraints. In the general case, multiple products are produced by a few competing producers (oligopoly) with limited capacities. Production quantities, prices and consequently profits depend on production and allocation decisions of each producer. In addition, there is competition for the ra...

This paper develops a theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium (see Shy, 1996, 2002; Morgan and Shy, 2013). In a general spatial setting, the set of undercut-proof prices is equivalent the core of a non-transferable utility cooperative-game, played on the set of outcomes that are feasible in Bertrand competition. The result depends critically on two conditions: First, firms mus...