This paper discusses the meaning of the Bulgarian and Turkish evidentials. I argue that evidential forms in these languages have a rich semantic content: they encode the source of information, epistemic modality, and temporality. Ultimately, I show that the meaning of the Bulgarian and Turkish evidentials is not reducible to the meaning of perfect forms, from which the evidential forms are hist...

How do skeptical thought experiments work? The skeptic invites us to “entertain” a vividly described possibility, then argues that skeptical conclusions follow from our inability to rule that possibility out. I contend that the argument’s soundness hinges on whether the skeptical possibilities generate legitimate doubts: we need to separate the issue of whether we can rule a possibility out fro...

Description iogics (aiso caiied terminoiogicai iogics, or concept ianguagesj are fragments of first-order logic that provide a formal account of the basic features of frame-based systems. However, there are aspects of frame-based systems-such as nonmonotonic reasoning and procedural rules-that cannot be characterized in a standard first-order framework. Such features are needed for real applica...

ROBERT SMITHSON: Apriority, Super-Rigidity, and Fregean Content (Under the direction of William Lycan) What is the difference between an utterance of the sentence 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and an utterance of the sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'? David Chalmers claims that these sentences are psychologically and epistemologically distinct because they are associated with distinct fine-grained Fre...

Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (see, e.g., [37], [24], [40], [46]) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model–suggested independently by Patrick Maher [40] and Graham Oddie [46]–that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehensive explanation. This ...

Several different Bayesian models of epistemic utilities (e.g., Levi 1962, Horwich 1982, Maher 1990, Oddie 1997) have been used to explain why it is rational for scientists to perform experiments. In this paper, I argue that a model—suggested independently by Patrick Maher (1990) and Graham Oddie (1997)—that assigns epistemic utility to degrees of belief in hypotheses provides the most comprehe...

We thank Dr. Evans for his letter (1). In reading his letter, it was difficult for us to sort out exactly what his criticism is of our editorial. However, we were able to discern three critical themes: (i) that we are guilty of “double counting” in the sense of counting both the benefits to human health from the knowledge gained via gain-of-function experiments on pathogens with pandemic potent...