Politicians regularly bargain with colleagues and other actors. Bargaining dynamics are central to theories of legislative politics representative democracy, bearing directly on the substance success legislation, policy, politicians’ careers. Yet, controlled evidence how legislators is scarce. Do they apply different strategies when engaging actors? If so, what they, why? To study these questio...

The Network Formation problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering only networks designed by sel sh users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network formation issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among agents. Both the Nash bargaining s...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems where the underlying economic opportunities are described by a partition function. This classic bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, and coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade. The theory ...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems where the underlying economic opportunities are described by a partition function. This classic bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional o¤ers, and coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade. The theory y...

Physical appearance influences behavior in a number of environments, yet surprisingly little is known about the influence of physical attractiveness on the bargaining process. We conducted an ultimatum game experiment to investigate the influence of physical attractiveness and gender on ultimatum game decisions. Results from this study revealed no significant differences in the offers or demand...

We investigate how informational frictions affect trading in decentralized markets in theory and in a laboratory setting. Subjects, matched pairwise at random, trade divisible commodities that have different private values for a divisible asset with a common value (interpreted as money). We compare a bargaining game with complete information with a bargaining game where agents can produce fraud...

Service Oriented Enterprises (SOEs) are subject to constant change and variation. In this paper, the changes are considered from an economic perspective based on service culture notion. Once a change is implemented, the costs of some member services may increase, whereas the costs of some other services may reduce. We construct a game theoretic model trying to capture the possible conflicting i...

Experimentally observed deviations of behavior from game theoretic predictions suggest that fairness does influence decision making. Fairness in the sense of equality has become an essential element of economic models aiming at explaining actual behavior (cf. Fehr/Schmidt 1999, Bolton/Ockenfels 2000). In this paper I will argue that equality is not the only fairness norm to be taken into accoun...