This paper argues for the moral significance of the notion of an evil person or character. First, I argue that accounts of evil character ought to support a robust bad/evil distinction; yet existing theories cannot plausibly do so. Consequentialist and related theories also fail to account for some crucial properties of evil persons. Second, I sketch an intuitively plausible “affective-motivati...

This paper argues that self-consciousness and moral agency depend crucially on both embodied and social aspects of human existence, and that the capacity for practical wisdom, phronesis, is central to moral personhood. The nature of practical wisdom is elucidated by drawing on rival analyses of expertise. Although ethical expertise and practical wisdom differ importantly, they are alike in that...

Boards of directors serve several functions, chief among them the monitoring of the firm and management. We model the monitoring activities of directors, who themselves face a moral hazard problem and need incentives to avoid shirking. The firm simultaneously sets wage incentives for all employees (directors and workers), and also chooses the size of the firm. Larger firms are more productive, ...

Three channels through which the IMF rescue package may affect international lending can be distinguished: debtor-side moral hazard, creditor-side moral hazard, and debtor and creditorsidemoral hazard.We show that if the rescue package fully benefits the debtor, no credit contract between him and the creditor arises. The other two kinds of moral hazard, where the creditor receives the rescue pa...

We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium characterization.

Governments and other organizations often outsource activities to achieve cost savings from market competition. Yet such benefits are often accompanied by poor quality resulting from moral hazard, which can be particularly onerous when outsourcing the monitoring and enforcement of government regulation. In this paper, we argue that the considerable moral hazard associated with private regulator...

Forgiveness is no simple matter either to execute or to understand. Charles Griswold explores forgiveness both in its guise as a virtue⎯I’ll call it “forgivingness”⎯and as something that’s more difficult to categorize, something like an act or process. Griswold’s Forgiveness provides a classical philosophical analysis of the act or process, “a theory of paradigmatic forgiveness⎯of what forgi...

The view that abortion is, with rare exceptions, seriously immoral has received little support in the recent philosophical literature. No doubt most philosophers affiliated with secular institutions of higher education believe that the anti-abortion position is either a symptom of irrational religious dogma or a conclusion generated by seriously confused philosophical argument. The purpose of t...

4 In this paper, we extend the framework of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) to the case 5 of moral hazard. Risk-averse consumers, who can influence the likelihood of states of 6 nature by undertaking a hidden action, receive insurance by voluntarily participating 7 in a pool of promises of deliveries of future uncertain endowments. In exchange, they 8 gain the right to receive a share of the total...