We explain why central counterparties (CCPs) emerged historically. With standardized contracts, it is optimal to insure counterparty risk by clearing those contracts through a CCP that uses novation and mutualization. As netting is not essential for these services, it does not explain why CCPs exist. In over-the-counter markets, as contracts are customized and not fungible, a CCP cannot fully g...

Hidden Insurance in a Moral Hazard Economy We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and in...

The paper studies the effects of non-exclusivity of credit card contracts on the provision of insurance through the institution of personal bankruptcy. In our model, lenders can continually observe borrower’s time-varying creditworthiness and provide credit to them by undercutting (poaching) the existing lender(s). Contracts are non-exclusive and, to rollover their debt, borrowers may accept mu...

In [Riesner, M., 2006. Hedging life insurance contracts in a Lévy process financial market. Insurance Math. Econom. 38, 599–608] the (locally) risk-minimizing hedging strategy for unit-linked life insurance contracts is determined in an incomplete financial market driven by a Lévy process. The considered risky asset is not a martingale under the original measure and therefore, a change of measu...

We present a mathematical solution to the insurance puzzle. Our solution only uses time-average growth rates and makes no reference to risk preferences. The insurance puzzle is this: according to the expectation value of wealth, buying insurance is only rational at a price that makes it irrational to sell insurance. There is no price that is beneficial to both the buyer and the seller of an ins...

In liability lawsuits (e.g., patent infringement), a plaintiff demands compensation from defendant, and the parties often negotiate settlement to avoid costly trial. Liability insurance creates bargaining leverage for defendant in this negotiation. We study characteristics of monopoly equilibrium contracts settings where effect is substantial source value insurance. Our results show that under ...

The multi-state life insurance contract is reconsidered in a framework of securitization where insurance claims may be priced by the principle of no arbitrage. This way a generalized version of Thiele’s differential equation (TDE) is obtained for insurance contracts linked to indices, possibly marketed securities. The equation is exemplified by a traditional policy, a simple unit-linked policy ...

In an editorial in ASTIN BULLETIN, Hans Bühlmann (2002) suggests it is time to change the teaching of life insurance theory towards the real life challenges of that industry. The following note is a response to this editorial. In Bergen we have partially taught the NUMAT, or the NUMeraire based Actuarial Teaching since the beginning of the 90ties at the Norwegian School of Economics and Busines...