This paper addresses tariff revenue concerns that some countries have been expressing in the context of the current multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. This paper: discusses methodological issues associated with estimating revenue impacts; provides impact estimates for a sample of developing countries; links the differences in impacts to cross-country differences ...

A simple two-country model of economic geography is constructed in order to examine the effect of tariff competition on the spatial distribution of manufacturing activities as well as on welfare. We show that when the transport cost is sufficiently small, tariff competition with firm migration leads to a core-periphery economy, where one of the two countries imposes no tariff in Nash equilibriu...

In general insurance tariffs consist of two components: First risks are classified according to a vector of basic criteria, say Xt, which for example in automobile insurance depend on the type or the power of the vehicles. Given the basic premiums, Xta, further extra charges and discounts are rated depending on usually more individual characteristics of the risk (say Zt). All relevant tariffs c...

This paper analyses the economic effects of different magnitudes of tariff cuts, different tariff cutting formulas, the implications of tariff capping as well as different numbers and width of tariff bands in the market access pillar of the Doha Round agricultural negotiations. The simulations are conducted with an extended version of the GTAP model and an extended version of the GTAP data base...

We show that the effects of tariff changes on welfare and import volume are fully characterised by their effects on the generalised mean and variance of the tariff distribution, implying two "cones of liberalisation" in commodity price space. Because welfare is negatively but import volume positively related to the generalised variance, the cones do not intersect, which poses a policy dilemma. ...

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off...