We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure an...

This article discusses the limitations of the orthodox economic theory of the firm as a nexus of contracts. Various experimental studies have shown that the aggregation of individuals in groups changes behavior and preferences systematically. This perspective has been formalized by models of interdependent preferences. Based on a prominent approach of interdependent preferences, intention-based...

We explore in this paper the axiomatic approach to the problem of sharing the revenue from bundled pricing. We formalize two models for this problem on the grounds of two different informational bases. In both models, we provide axiomatic rationale for natural rules to solve the problem. We, nonetheless, obtain drastic differences under each scenario, which highlights the importance of setting ...

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step t...

In this paper, by employing the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) techniques and Chinese provincial level data from 1991 to 2003, we empirically investigate the relationship between finance and growth in post-reform China. We find that financial development significantly promotes economic growth in coastal regions but not in inland regions; the weak finance-growth nexus in inland provinces has...

We study the stabilitywith respect to the introduction of opportunitybased inequity aversion a la Dufwenberg et al. (2011) of three welfare properties satisfiedbycompetitive equilibria in self-regarding economies: (i) Pareto efficiencymay not be a stable property; (ii) undomination with respect to income redistribution is a stablepropertywhenever themarginal indirect utility of income has no ex...

Empirical Approaches to Inequality of Opportunity: Principles, Measures, and Evidence We put together the different conceptual issues involved in measuring inequality of opportunity, discuss how these concepts have been translated into computable measures, and point out the problems and choices researchers face when implementing these measures. Our analysis identifies and suggests several new p...

We consider the problem of allocating a finite number of indivisible items to two players with additive utilities. We design a procedure that looks for all the maximin allocations. The procedure makes repeated use of an extension of the Adjusted Winner, an effective procedure that deals with divisible items, to find new candidate solutions, and to suggest which items should be assigned to the p...

It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of deÞning social preferences over distributions of a Þxed bundle of divisible goods. The paper follows an approach to preference aggregation which relies only on interpersonally non-comparable preferences, and circumvents Arrow’s impossibility by taking account of the shape of indifference ...