Abstract Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Right makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles play inquiry if accept this claim. It turns out position lends itself conclusion while false is possible not even terribly uncommon, be rationally sure don’t currently any perhaps...

Abstract We argue that some fictional truths are fictionally true by default. also these subject to being undermined. propose the context within which we evaluate what is changes when a possibility was previously ignorable brought attention. cases support model of truth makes conversational dynamics determining in fiction structurally akin knowledge-ascription, as this understood David Lewis’s ...

Abstract Metasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these do not purport to refer substantive properties. This combination makes attractive for philosophers who see themselves antirealists. Although attractio...

With the unit interval [0,1] as the truth value table, Chen and Wupresented the concept of  possibility computation over dcpos.Indeed, every possibility computation can be considered as a[0,1]-valued Scott open set on a dcpo. The aim of this paper is tostudy Chen-Wu's duality on quantale-valued setting. For clarity,with a commutative unital quantale $L$ as the truth value table, weintroduce a c...

Repetition has been shown to increase subjective truth ratings of trivia statements. This truth effect can be measured in two ways: (a) as the increase in subjective truth from the first to the second encounter (within-items criterion) and (b) as the difference in truth ratings between repeated and other new statements (between-items criterion). Qualitative differences are assumed between the p...