In many practical contexts where a number of agents have to find a common decision, the votes do not come all together at the same time. In such situations, we may want to preprocess the information given by the subelectorate (consisting of the voters who have expressed their votes) so as to “compile” the known votes for the time when the latecomers have expressed their votes. We study the amou...

While most older adults say their mental health is very good, a third or more have symptoms associated with emotional challenges, according to new survey released by the AARP that focuses on how much pandemic has taken its toll health.

Previous work shows that candidates receive more personal votes, frequently called “friends-and-neighbors” votes, in areas where they have local attachments. This article examines heterogeneity in friends-and-neighbors voting near candidates’ counties of birth and residence in U.S. statewide executive office elections. Using two large datasets, I estimate how the magnitude of the friends-and-ne...

We study vote trading—trading of votes for votes—through the tools of the matching literature. Decentralized vote trading is modeled via an algorithm that executes a sequence of binding, myopic, strictly improving pair-wise trades. We show that with binary alternatives, an odd number of voters, and separable preferences, the sequence always converges to a stable vote allocation—a distribution o...

The storable votes mechanism is a voting method for committees that meet periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the sequence of decisions. This provides incentives for voters to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them more, typically generating welfare gains over standard majority voting ...

The Coalitional Manipulation (CM) problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many voting rules. The CM problem, however, has been studied only in the complete information setting, that is, when the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators. A more realistic scenario is an incomplete information setting where the manipulators do not know the exact votes of the nonmanipu...