What is the connection between having a phenomenal property and knowing that one has property? A traditional view on matter takes to be quite intimate. Whenever property, knows does. Recently most authors have denied this view. The goal of paper defend In fact, I will something much stronger: argue what it for (consistent) must know oneself when it. As we see, theory number surprising welcome u...

of the original article: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different “consciousnesses.” Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often part...

Pentecostal and healing practices could not be separated in Theology because are the most phenomenal practice tradition. This is essential regarding growth of Churches worldwide. Especially context churches Indonesia, I will describe how grew so fast that revival impacted them. give my analytical critics this phenomenon through discussion with works literature available bring suggestion contrib...

Disjunctivism about perception is a view about the relation between veridical experiences and hallucinations. Suppose that I see a green cube, and my experience is veridical—no illusion or hallucination is involved.1 The veridical experience, according to disjunctivists, includes as constituents the bit of the world that is perceived and the perceptual relation that the subject bears to it, and...

Siewert's book revolves around three theses: that there is a distinctive style of epistemic warrant associated with the first-person point of view, that if we pay close attention to the deliverances of this first-person point of view, we will see that phenomenal consciousness is both real and yet neglected by many current theories that purport to explain consciousness, and that phenomenal consc...

Confronted with the apparent explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness, philosophers have reacted in many different ways. Some deny that any explanatory gap exists at all. Some hold that there is an explanatory gap for now, but that it will eventually be closed. Some hold that the explanatory gap corresponds to an ontological gap in nature. In this paper, I want to explore an...

Block (1995) famously warns against the confusion of ‘access-consciousness’ and ‘phenomenal consciousness’. Access consciousness occurs when the content of a mental state is poised for the control of rational action, for verbal report and for use in reasoning. Phenomenal consciousness, by contrast, involves the harder-to-define presence of experiential properties, of there being ‘something it i...

Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed datasets from the National fMRI Data Center are considered: Hazeltine et al., Neural activation du...