General Game Playing is the design of AI systems able to understand rules new games and use such descriptions play those effectively. Games with imperfectinformation have recently been added as a challenge forexisting general game-playing systems. The HyperPlay technique presents solution this by maintaining collection models true game foundation for reasoning, move selection. provides existing...

An algorithm i s developed for searching the trees of "perfect information" games involving chance events. Many dice games (e.g. backgammon, craps, and monopoly and similar board games), and some card games (e.g. casino blackjack), have this property. For depth 3 trees, empirical observation reveals a search reduction of more than 50 percent, while closed-form analysis reveals a best-case compl...

Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important model of dynamic games where the players are allowed to forget previously known information. Often, imperfect recall games are the result of an abstraction algorithm that simplifies a large game with perfect recall. Unfortunately, solving an imperfect recall game has fundamental problems since a Nash equilibrium does not have to exist....

An agent, or a coalition of agents, faces an ethical dilemma between several statements if she is forced to make conscious choice which these will be true. This paper proposes capture dilemmas as modality in strategic game settings with and without limit on sacrifice for perfect imperfect information games. The authors show that the cannot defined through earlier proposed blameworthiness modali...

Until recently, AI research that used games as an experimental testbed has concentrated on perfect information games. Many of these games have been amenable to so-called brute-force search techniques. In contrast, games of imperfect information, such as bridge and poker, contain hidden knowledge making similar search techniques impractical. This paper describes work being done on developing a w...

Subjective games of incomplete information are formulated where some of the key assumptions of Bayesian games of incomplete information are relaxed. The issues arising because of the new formulation are studied in the context of a class of nonzero-sum, two-person games, where each player has a different model of the game. The static game is investigated in this note. It is shown that the proper...

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the the payoff function is both shift-invariant and submixing, then the game is half-positional, i.e. the first player has an optimal strategy which is both deter...

A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver’s preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structu...

We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information, or BWR-games, given by a digraph G = (V,E), with local rewards r : E → Z, and three types of positions: black VB , white VW , and random VR forming a partition of V . It is a long-standing open question whether a polynomial time algorithm for BWR-games exists, even when |VR| = 0. In fact, a pseudo-polynomial ...