Due to users’ fast-growing demands, wireless spectrum is becoming a more and more scarce resource. However, the state of spectrum usage shows that while large chunks of spectrum are left idle at many places, many emerging wireless applications cannot get enough spectrum to provide their services. In contrast to existing truthful mechanisms for channel redistribution, which achieve strategy-proo...

Novel auction schemes are constantly being designed. Their design has significant consequences for the allocation of goods and the revenues generated. But how to tell whether a new design has the desired properties, such as efficiency, i.e. allocating goods to those bidders who value them most? We say: by formal, machine-checked proofs. We investigated the suitability of the Isabelle, Theorema,...

The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services (PCS). There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policy makers. In this p...

We study the problem of designing a new trading market for dynamic spectrum sharing when there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers. First, we study the interaction among homogeneous buyers of spectrum as a noncooperative game and show the existence of a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (SMSNE). Second, we assume that the sellers employ an optimal mechanism, called the generalized ...

The technical-economic performances of static (traditional) and auction-driven dynamic radiospectrum allocation (FSA and DSA), and of an utopian “federated” network (with all spectrum and customers) are compared. Spectrum licensees operate cellular CDMA networks populated by heterogeneous data-downloading terminals, which may experience ultra-wide-band (UWB) interference. A terminal has its own...

Inspired by the recent developments in the field of Spectrum Auctions, we have tried to provide a comprehensive framework for the complete procedure of Spectrum Licensing. We have identified the various issues the Governments need to decide upon while designing the licensing procedure and what are the various options available in each issue. We also provide an in depth study of how each of this...

Recently proposed dynamic spectrum leasing (DSL) for dynamic spectrum sharing (DSS) presumes that there is a reward for primary users for accepting secondary activity. The reward primary users received in previous DSL proposals, however, were considered to be proportional to the secondary interference level. In this paper, we propose a new way to encourage primary users to lease their spectrum:...