We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity con...

We consider a setting in which two firms compete to spread rumors in a social network. Firms seed their rumors simultaneously and rumors propagate according to the linear threshold model. Using the concept of cascade centrality introduced by [19], we provide a sharp characterization of networks that admit pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). We provide tight bounds for the efficiency of these ...

This paper shows that complementary interaction induces people to care about social status because it serves as a signal of non-observable abilities. There is a unique equilibrium in which everyone cares about social status. In this equilibrium a person’s social status perfectly reveals his abilities, and everyone matches with a person of like ability. By interpreting social status as a signal ...

We examine optimal taxation and social insurance if insurance markets are imperfect. This requires the development of a theory of labor supply under uncertainty. We show that the case for social insurance is not generally reinforced by adverse selection in insurance markets as social insurance will have welfare-decreasing e ects on the labor market. Furthermore, positive and normative implicati...

We examine how interaction choices depend on the interplay of social and physical distance, and show that agents who are more central in the social network, or are located closer to the geographic center of interaction, choose higher levels of interactions in equilibrium. As a result, the level of interactivity in the economy as a whole will rise with the density of links in the social network ...

This paper investigates the interrelations between social control mechanisms, social networks and collective action. We introduce a game theoretical model that explains how and under what conditions social networks rationalize participation in collective action and how can collective action reshape network relations in single encounters. The key mobilizing forces in collective action are interp...

We study the emergence of cooperation in dynamic, anonymous social networks, such as in online communities. We examine prisoner’s dilemma played under a social matching protocol, where individuals form random links to partners with whom they can interact. Cooperation results in mutual benefits, whereas defection results in a high short-term gain. Moreover, an agent that defects can escape recip...

A probabilistic voting model with voter utility functions that are not necessarily concave is examined. When voters are polarized, there is a convexity threshold of their utility function below which policy convergence is a unique equilibrium, and above which policy divergence is a unique equilibrium. Divergent equilibrium is more likely when voters become more polarized. Social welfare is maxi...

This paper examines repeated implementation of a social choice function (SCF) with infinitely-lived agents whose preferences are determined randomly in each period. An SCF is repeated-implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a sequence of (possibly history-dependent) mechanisms such that (i) its Nash equilibrium set is non-empty and (ii) every Nash equilibrium outcome corresponds to th...