Copyright violations are an increasing problem for hardware designers. Illegal copies of IP cores can cost manufactures millions of dollars. As one possible solution to this problem, digital watermarking for integrated circuits has been proposed in the past. We propose a new watermarking mechanism that is based on side-channels and that can easily and reliably be detected. The idea is to embed ...

From its ancient origin as a tool for protecting sensitive wartime or espionage-related messages, cryptography has become a foundational building-block for securing the systems, protocols, and infrastructure that underpin our modern interconnected world. But the physical mechanisms used in performing encryption and decryption can leak information, making it possible to bypass this security. Pro...

Protocol tunneling is widely used to add security and/or privacy to Internet applications. Recent research has exposed side channel vulnerabilities that leak information about tunneled protocols. We first discuss the timing side channels that have been found in protocol tunneling tools. We then show how to infer Hidden Markov models (HMMs) of network protocols from timing data and use the HMMs ...

Smart cards are small, portable, tamper-resistant computers used in securitysensitive applications ranging from identi_cation and access control to payment systems. Side-channel attacks, which use clues from timing, power consumption, or even electromagnetic (EM) signals, can compromise the security of these devices and have been an active research area since 1996. Newer contactless” cards comm...

The paper presents several improved side channel cube attacks on PRESENT based on single bit leakage model. Compared with the previous study of Yang et al in CANS 2009 [30], based on the same model of single bit leakage in the 3 round, we show that: if the PRESENT cipher structure is unknown, for the leakage bit 0, 32-bit key can be recovered within 2 chosen plaintexts; if the cipher structure ...

This paper consists of two parts: First part deals with activities of TSRC. Second part is about TSRC comments on 140-3, which is primarily the same as the comments submitted to NIST last February, where we discussed that the forthcoming standards of cryptographic module should include the Side Channel Security Requirement (SCSR). Although SCSR may be described focusing on attack technique or c...

In this short note we review the state-of-the-art of sidechannel attacks on implementations of stream ciphers. We overview published work. We also survey the most commonly used countermeasures and how they influence the cost and security of an implementation. The recommendations given in this note result from our practical experience with side-channel attacks and countermeasures in general, and...

Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences. Previously proposed countermeasures fail to prevent keystroke timing attacks as they do not protect keystroke processing among the entire software stack. We clos...

Recent attacks show how an unskilled implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems may reveal the involved secrets from a single execution of the algorithm. Most attacks exploit the property that addition and doubling on elliptic curves are different operations and so can be distinguished from side-channel analysis. Known countermeasures suggest to add dummy operations or to use specific param...