In e-marketplaces with limited inventory where buyers’ demand is larger than sellers’ supply, promoting honesty raises new challenges: sellers may behave dishonestly because they can sell out all products without the necessity of gaining high reputation; buyers may provide untruthful ratings to mislead other buyers in order to have a higher chance to obtain the limited products. In this paper, ...

In this paper, we explore the use of the web as an environment for electronic commerce. In particular, we develop a novel mechanism that creates incentives for honesty in electronic marketplaces where human users are represented by buying and selling agents. In our mechanism, buyers model other buyers and select the most trustworthy ones as their neighbors from which they can ask advice about s...

a r t i c l e i n f o Motivated by the contradictory findings in literature regarding whether high-reputation sellers enjoy a price premium over low-reputation sellers, this paper examines the pricing strategies of sellers with different reputation levels. We find that a negative price premium effect (i.e., a high-reputation seller charges a lower price than a low-reputation seller) exists due ...

Existing reputation systems used by online auction houses do not address the concern of a buyer shopping for commodities—finding a good bargain. These systems do not provide information on the practices adopted by sellers to ensure profitable auctions. These practices may be legitimate, like imposing a minimum starting bid on an auction, or fraudulent, like using colluding bidders to inflate th...

furrow irrigation is the most common type of surface irrigation. determine the advance and recession time in the field is required the accurate measurement and this can be costly and time consuming. winsrfr model is used for simulation furrow irrigation by zero inertia and kinematic wave engines. using this model, advance time, reaction time, infiltration depth, runoff depth and application eff...

This study examines how sellers respond to changes in the design of reputation systems on eBay. Specifically, we focus on one particular strategic behavior on eBay’s reputation system, the sellers’ explicit retaliation against negative feedback provided by buyers to coerce buyers into revoking their negative feedback. We examine how these strategic sellers respond to the removal of their abilit...

In this paper, we demonstrate the value of decentralized models of sellers in electronic marketplaces, as the basis for purchasing decisions from buyers. We discuss how buying agents can model the reputation of sellers in order to make effective purchases and how these agents can also take advantage of reputation ratings provided by other buying agents in the marketplace, once it is established...

We study the effects of improvements in eBay’s rating mechanism on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. Following a large sample of sellers over time, we exploit the fact that the rating mechanism was changed to reduce strategic bias in buyer rating. That improvement did not lead to increased exit of poorly rated sellers. Yet, buyer valuation of the staying sellers—especially the poorl...

When it is costly to participate in the sale of an asset, potential buyers typically submit offers either simultaneously, as in an auction, or sequentially, so that later potential entrants may observe previous bids. We show in an IPV setting that when the entry process is selective, so that buyers with higher values are more likely to enter, both sellers and buyers generally prefer the sequent...

This paper analyzes the market for financial information and the incentive of institutions, such as Reuters, to provide information to traders in decentralized financial markets. We derive the following results. (i) The optimal selling strategy consists of selling identical information (Reuters’ screen) to all traders. (ii) The traders buy information from the same providers. If the traders may...