In this article, we investigate different market structures where decision makers are incentivized by both profit and revenue. Our innovation is that consider managers evaluate revenue in a non-linear way, exhibiting diminishing marginal utility. This implies incremental changes revenue—for example, due to demand shocks—generate production choices depend on the existing base of firm. We show in...

Individuals relying on natural resource extraction for their livelihood face high income variability driven by a mix of environmental, biological, management, and economic factors. Key to managing these industries is identifying how regulatory actions and individual behavior affect income variability, financial risk, and, by extension, the economic stability and the sustainable use of natural r...

This paper presents a framework for assessing the fiscal condition index (FCI) and develops a concept to assess fiscal condition of governments and implements it into Iran government as an oil exporting country. The concept consists of four dimensions ­-revenue, expenditure, budget balance, and debt structure-and each dimension has its own indicators. There are seven indicators examined namely ...

The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenu...

We consider a general class of network revenue management problems, where mean demand at each point in time is determined by a vector of prices, and the objective is to dynamically adjust these prices so as to maximize expected revenues over a finite sales horizon. A salient feature of our problem is that the decision maker can only observe realized demand over time but does not know the underl...

The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price sealed bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first...