A key challenge in non-cooperative multi-agent systems is that of developing efficient planning algorithms for intelligent agents to perform effectively among boundedly rational, self-interested (i.e., non-cooperative) agents (e.g., humans). To address this challenge, we investigate how intention prediction can be efficiently exploited and made practical in planning, thereby leading to efficien...

Recent years have seen an increasing interest of multiagent system research in employing the theory of argumentation for the development of communication protocols. While significant progress has been made in formalising argument-based communication, (possibly adaptive) agent-level argumentation strategies as a practical integration of rational agent reasoning and inter-agent argumentation dial...

Artificial Intelligence encompasses the enterprise of building an intelligent agent. To this purpose, the notions of agency and intelligence need to be precisely defined. Much to our demise, intelligence has proved to be hard to grasp in a formal way. To overcome this, Stuart Russell— among others—propounded rational agency as an alternative characterization for intelligent agency. In his own w...

Abstract In this paper, we derive the Stackelberg solution associated with a leader–follower rational expectations model. By solving dynamic optimization problem subject to forward and backward stochastic difference equations (FBSDEs), obtain strategy of leader an adapted open-loop information structure, in terms FBSDEs. Furthermore, solve FBSDEs by establishing nonhomogeneous relationship betw...

Abstract We provide a survey of the state art rational verification : problem checking whether given temporal logic formula ϕ is satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria multi-agent system – that is, will exhibit behavior represents under assumption agents within act rationally pursuit their preferences. After motivating and introducing overall framework verification, we discuss key r...

Abstract Is it ever rational to suspend judgment about whether a particular doxastic attitude of ours is rational? An agent who suspends her has serious doubts that is. These place special burden on the agent, namely, justify maintaining chosen over others. A dilemma arises. Providing justification for would commit considering rational—contrary suspension matter. Alternatively, in absence such ...

Since the start of the rational-expectations revolution in the mid 1970s, macroeco­ nomic analysis has been dominated by the assumption of the rational representative agent. This assumption has now become the main building block of macroeconomic modeling, so much so that macroeconomic models without a microfoundation based on the rationality assumption are simply no longer taken seriously. The ...

Harsanyi defends utilitarianism by means of an axiomatic proof and by what he calls the ‘equiprobability model’. Both justifications of utilitarianism aim to show that utilitarian ethics can be derived from Bayesian rationality and some weak moral constraints on the reasoning of rational agents. I argue that, from the perspective of Bayesian agents, one of these constraints, the impersonality c...