Given a non-negative integral m × n matrix A : I × J → ZZ+, the game Seki is defined as follows. Two players R and C take turns and it is specified who begins (this player is called the first and the opponent second). By one move a player can either reduce a strictly positive entry of A by 1 or pass. If both players pass then the game results in a draw. Player R (respectively, C) wins if a row ...

in this paper, a novel hybrid model based on neural network and game theory is proposed to support the analyzers in oil market. in this model, first the neural network is utilized to learn the oil prices associated with opec production level and usa imports level. then the learned neural network is applied by a game model. finally the nash equilibrium points of the game present the optimum deci...

CONTEXT Children's exposure to violence in the media remains a source of public health concern; however, violence in video games rated T (for "Teen") by the Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB) has not been quantified. OBJECTIVE To quantify and characterize the depiction of violence and blood in T-rated video games. According to the ESRB, T-rated video games may be suitable for persons ...

Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to allow for the stable coexistence between unconditional cooperators and defectors in well-mixed populations. This is a consequence of a self-organizing proces...

We study the relationship between a player’s lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring and this player’s min max payoff in the corresponding one-shot game. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under an identifiability assumption, we further show that, if the monitoring structure of an infinitely repeated...

A zero sum game is a simultaneous move game between 2 players. Such a game is represented by a matrix A ∈ Rm×n. The strategies of the “row” (resp. “column”) player are the rows (resp. columns) of A. If the row player plays strategy i ∈ [m] and the column player plays j ∈ [n] then the outcome is Aij . 1 Interpret this as that the row player pays Aij amount of money to the column player, therefor...

I study the payoff orders of bimatrix games classifying them into pure mutual interest, pure conflict and mixed motive games. These notions, informally introduced by [13] Schelling (1960), are then used to explore experimentally some regularities of perception of strategic interaction in 2x2 games with incomplete information about the opponent’s payoff matrix. Using data from [10] Oechssler/Sch...

Analytical accounts chronicling engagement with digital games can always benefit from empirical data outlining the patterns of behavior produced by different players as they engage with the same game, or similar sequence within a game. This paper presents an extension to the novel method previously introduced in Marczak et al. (2013; 2015) and Schott et al. (2014), termed feedback-based game me...

We consider a two-player partial-information game on a Markov chain, where each player attempts to minimize its own cost over a finite time horizon. We show that this game has always a Nash equilibrium in stochastic behavioral policies. The technique used to prove this result is constructive but has severe limitations because it involves solving an extremely large bi-matrix game. To alleviate t...

Nash equilibrium constitutes a central solution concept in game theory. The task of detecting the Nash equilibria of a finite strategic game remains a challenging problem up-to-date. This paper investigates the effectiveness of three computational intelligence techniques, namely, covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategies, particle swarm optimization, as well as, differential evolution, ...