A new multivariate heavy-tailed distribution is proposed as an extension of the univariate distribution of Politis (2004). The properties of the new distribution are discussed, as well as its effectiveness in modeling ARCH/GARCH residuals. A practical procedure for multiparameter numerical maximum likelihood is also given, and a real data example is worked out. JEL codes: C3; C5.

This paper reviews the results from experimental measures of risk aversion for evidence of systematic differences in the behavior of men and women. In most studies, women are found to be more averse to risk than men. Studies with contextual frames show less consistent results. JEL Codes: C91, D81, J16

We extend the finite automata approach to evaluate complexity of strategies in iterative adjustment processes such as auctions. Intuitively, a strategy’s complexity is equal to the number of different contingencies in which qualitatively different behaviors are prescribed. Complexity may explain bidder choice of strategies in multi-unit iterative auctions. JEL classification codes: D44, C73

I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability. JEL Codes: C62, C72, C73

This paper shows that many estimators of thresholds in ordered response models exist, because binary choice location estimators can be converted into threshold estimators. A new threshold estimator is proposed that is consistent under more general conditions. An extension to random thresholds is provided. JEL codes: C14, C25, C13.

This chapter surveys the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination and affirmative action. This literature suggests different explanations for the existence and persistence of group inequality. This survey highlights such differences and describes in these contexts the effects of color-sighted and color-blind affirmative action policies, and the efficiency implications of discriminat...

In this paper, we provide an alternative definition of NTU convexity, strongly ordinal convexity. We show that if a game is strongly ordinal convex, then any marginal worth vector is in the core, and any marginal contribution is increasing. Some economic examples satisfy this convexity. KeywordsCooperative game; Convex game; NTU game; Core; Supermodularity JEL classification codes: C62; D52; D53

We provide a computable algorithm to calculate uniform ε-optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our approach can be used to construct algorithms that calculate uniform ε-equilibria and uniform correlated ε-equilibria in various classes of multi-player non-zero-sum stochastic games. JEL codes: C63, C73.

Based on Lewbel, Chiappori and Browning (2002), this paper summarizes how the use of collective models of household behavior can overcome the identiÞcation problems associated with the construction and estimation of adult equivalence scales. JEL codes: K1, D1, J17, C30, I31.

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets. JEL Codes: C72, D30, D70, O10, P0