Abstract: The proof of Proposition 4 in Hermalin and Katz (1991) is incorrect, because it fails to check post-renegotiation utilities against the incentive compatibility constraints. This note states and proves a comparable proposition with a slightly stronger assumption regarding the monotonicity of bargaining. This result vindicates the central intuition of Hermalin and Katz about the potenti...

Abstract: The proof of Proposition 4 in Hermalin and Katz (1991) is incorrect, because it fails to check post-renegotiation utilities against the incentive compatibility constraints. This note states and proves a comparable proposition with a slightly stronger assumption regarding the monotonicity of bargaining. This result vindicates the central intuition of Hermalin and Katz about the potenti...

This paper extends Lee and Sabourian [14] and examines repeated implementation of a social choice function in a general incomplete information environment where agents are in…nitely-lived and their preferences are determined stochastically in each period. Our main result establishes how any e¢ cient social choice function can be repeatedly implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Neither incen...

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core convergence to price equilibrium allocations. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL clas...

In enforcing policy measures under incomplete information neither an individual nor a collective penalty may generate sufficient incentive compatibility. Individual monitoring may be avoided, while collective penalties may lead to multiple Nash-equilibria. In this paper it is shown that by combining elements of both kind of penalties these problems are solved: circumventing monitoring devices d...

In large quasilinear economies, we provide sufficient conditions to establish the nonemptiness of several versions of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication. This is done by proving nonemptiness of approximate ex post cores satisfying incentive compatibility. When the number of agents with private information remains finite, the main argument relies on an adaptation of the smal...

We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency. 1998 ACM Subject Classification F...

BACKGROUND Stroke may lead to several health problems, but positive effects can be promoted by learning to perform physical therapy techniques correctly. OBJECTIVE To compare two different types of observational practice (video instructions and demonstration by a physical therapist) during the use of incentive spirometry (IS). METHOD A total of 20 patients with diagnosis of stroke and 20 he...

We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modi…cations to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive compatibility. The …rst stage essentially elicits that part of the agents’private information that induces interde...