Imperfect altruism between generations may lead to insufficient capital accumulation. We study the welfare consequences of taxing the rent on a fixed production factor, such as land, in combination with age-dependent redistributions as a remedy. Taxing rent enhances welfare by increasing capital investment. This holds for any tax rate and recycling of the tax revenues except for combinations of...

The paper deals with rent-seeking behaviour among agents competing for future shares of a common renewable natural resource. Rent-seeking might become profitable when the agents expect that the distribution of the natural resource in future periods will be dependent on the agents’ extraction of the resource in the past, even though high exploitation might reduce the stock that future individual...

The paper deals with rent-seeking behaviour among agents competing for future shares of a common renewable natural resource. Rent-seeking might become profitable when the agents expect that the distribution of the natural resource in future periods will be dependent on the agents’ extraction of the resource in the past, even though high exploitation might reduce the stock that future individual...

The establishment of new environmental regulation, such as emissions taxes and tradable pollution permit markets, create rents that can be captured through a process of socially wasteful rent seeking. In this paper, we create a framework that compares social welfare under alternative market-based environmental policy instruments when agents lobby for the contestable rent. We show revenue raisin...

Economic conditions in the aftermath of Covid-19 pandemic create an uncertain environment for all levels community, resulting anxiety everyone. The majority B40 group has difficulty obtaining credit from banks due to a lack history and collateral. is among affected financing any financial institution. It makes it more difficult them buy house obtain assistance institutions. As result, they are ...

Nowadays, the enterprises outsource components to others, but they have not full control about delivery times, neither about components quality or defined specifications inspection during their production, because they have no remote monitoring or controlling services available in the others shop floor enterprises, even in enterprises of the same group. Moreover, when their shop floor resources...

We consider n firms which choose rent-seeking expenditures sequentially, each player anticipating the rent-seeking expenditures that will be made by later movers. We find that the earlier movers need not make larger profits than later movers, and that aggregate profits are lower than in a game in which firms make simultaneous moves.

This paper shows that a policy that uniformly increases contestants’ effort costs can lead to an increase in total effort. In asymmetric settings, this “levels the playing field” and therefore encourages weaker players (who otherwise would have stayed out) to enter. Paradoxically, a contest designer whose only objective is to maximize total effort may thus wish to make rent-seeking “more diffic...