This paper employs Roback’s locational-equilibrium model of public-goods pricing, crosssectional data from the Census of Population and Housing, and SMSA-level estimates of public capital stocks in order to examine the productive contribution of public capital. I find that public capital has a small positive impact on private output. JEL classification codes: E62, R53

If the value cumulative distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports, a simple geometric argument establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model.  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44

In the jungle, power and coercion govern the exchange of resources. We study a simple, stylized model of the jungle that mirrors an exchange economy. We define the notion of jungle equilibrium and demonstrate that a number of standard results of competitive markets hold in the jungle. JEL Classification: C7, D4, S477, B201

Computation of exact equilibrium values for n-player divide-the-dollar legislative bargaining games as in Baron and Ferejohn (1989) with general quota voting rules, recognition probabilities, and discount factors, can be achieved by solving at most n bivariate square linear systems of equations. The approach recovers Eraslan’s (2002) uniqueness result and relies on a characterization of equilib...

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core convergence to price equilibrium allocations. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL clas...

We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migr...

The paper analyzes spatial Cournot competition among multi-store firms. It demonstrates that the complex problem of determining equilibrium store locations for competing multi-store firms can be approximated by a simple one, in which each firm behaves as a multi-store monopolist in choosing its store locations. A firm’s equilibrium store locations often coincide with its monopoly locations, and...

This paper suggests a new methodology for evaluating technological change in a multi-sector general equilibrium framework. The double calibration technique was applied to an ex post decomposition analysis of technological change between two periods, enabling a distinction to be made between price-induced and factor-biased technological changes for each sector. The method is applied to an empiri...

We provide general conditions under which an economic theory has a universal axiomatization: one that leads to testable implications. Roughly speaking, if we obtain a universal axiomatization when we assume that unobservable parameters (such as preferences) are observable, then we can obtain a universal axiomatization purely on observables. The result “explains” classical revealed preference th...