This paper develops the concept of contractual equilibrium for repeated games with transferable utility, whereby the players negotiate cooperatively over their continuation strategies at the start of each period. Players may disagree in the negotiation phase, and continuation play may be suboptimal under disagreement. Under agreement, play is jointly optimal in the continuation game, and the pl...

1.1 Classic Cooperative TU Games In classic cooperative games with transferable utility [4] (TU games), there is a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}, where each subset S of N has some value v(S). The goal of the agents is to first form a coalition structure by partitioning N into disjoint sets; second, the value of each set in the partition is divided among its members. The payoff division x = (...

Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single out the most desirable outcomes in terms of appropriate notions of worth distributions, which are usually called solution concepts. Motivated by the fact th...

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel family of games related to congested networks. Traffic routing has been extensively analyzed from the non-cooperative aspect. A common assumption is that each individual optimizes his route in the network selfishly. However looking at the same network from a different scope in some cases we can find some actors that are responsible for the major...

We reconsider the well known Becker-Coase (BC ) argument, according to which changes in divorce laws should not affect divorce rates, in the context of households which consume public goods in addition to private goods. For this result to hold, utility must be transferable both within marriage and upon divorce, and the marginal rate of substitution between public and private consumption needs t...

A model of the labor market under search frictions is developed, where participants are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity types and the individual decision of which type of agents to match with is endogenized. Wages are negotiated, so that all gains from trade are exploited. This has important implications for the equilibrium outcomes. In particular, two applications are studied....

The rapid development and deployment of vehicle technologies offer opportunities to re-think the way traffic is managed. This article capitalizes on connectivity proposes an economic instrument corresponding cooperative framework for allocating priority at intersections. compatible with a variety existing intersection control approaches. Similar free markets, our allows vehicles trade their tim...

A game-theoretic approach based on the framework of transferable-utility cooperative games is developed to assess reliability transfer nodes in public transportation networks case stochastic times. game defined, whose model takes into account system, travel times, transfers and associated users’ demand. The stops are modeled as players such a game, Shapley value – solution concept theory used i...