Nash equilibrium is often interpreted as a steady state in which each player holds the correct expectations about the other players’ behavior and acts rationally. This paper investigates the robustness of this interpretation when there are small costs associated with complicated forecasts. The model consists of a two-person strategic game in which each player chooses a finite machine to impleme...

In this paper we argue that the semantics of UML Statecharts, while adequate for design, is inappropriate for implementation. To address the issues raised, we propose a language, ECharts, that incorporates modifications to UML Statecharts. We argue that the ECharts semantics strike the right balance between supporting design and supporting implementation. We compare ECharts language features wi...

Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a steady state where players hold correct beliefs about the other players’ behavior and act rationally. We experimentally examine the process that leads to this steady state. Our results indicate that some players emerge as “teachers” — those subjects who, by their actions, try to influence the beliefs of their opponent and lead the way to a more favorable...