Formal epistemologists often claim that our credences should be representable by a probability function. Complete probabilistic coherence, however, is only possible for ideal agents, raising the question of how this requirement relates to everyday judgments concerning rationality. One answer being rational contextual matter, standards rationality change along with situation. Just like who count...

Given that the assumption of perfect rationality is rarely met in the real world, we explore a graded notion of rationality in socioecological systems of networked actors. We parametrize an actors' rationality via their place in a social network and quantify system rationality via the average Jensen-Shannon divergence between the games Nash and logit quantal response equilibria. Previous work h...

The introduction of a small amount of bounded rationality into a model sometimes has little effect, and sometimes has a dramatic impact on predicted behavior. We call a model robust to bounded rationality if small deviations from rationality result only in small changes in the equilibrium set. We also say that a model is structurally stable if the equilibrium set (given fully rational agents) v...

We report the results of a simulation study in which we explore the joint effect of group absorptive capacity (as the average individual rationality of the group members) and cognitive distance (as the distance between the most rational group member and the rest of the group) on the emergence of collective rationality in groups. We start from empirical results reported in the literature on grou...

Settling disputes, even disputes about meaning, by third party arbitration is different from settling them by negotiation. Moreover, disputes can be settled by a procedure in which the disputing parties follow a protocol that prohibits them from simply following their original aims. They can collectively constitute an arbitrator. This provides an alternative model for resolving differences in m...