We consider a variant of the standard Arrow{Debreu model which contains a number of indivisible goods and one perfectly divisible good (numeraire or money). The objective of this paper is to clarify a general mathematical mechanism which guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in such a model. It is shown that the crucial condition for the existence of an equilibrium is that the sets of supp...

Local energy communities are proposed as a regulatory framework to enable the market participation of end-consumers. However, volatile local market-clearing prices, and consequently, cost give rise participants with generally heterogeneous risk attitudes. To prevent increased operational due conservative trading decisions in forward stage, e.g., day-ahead market, we propose via financial hedgin...

Debreu and Scarf (1963), Hildenbrand (1974), Aumann (1964), Dierker (1975), Bewley (1973), others have shown that the core of an exchange economy with infinitely many or finitely traders converges. However, does not always consist traders. This note provides proof convergence theorem on limited by a bargaining game methodology. The main contribution this is to innovate equilibrium solution in e...

Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the exchange economy. This paper takes a significant step towards understanding computational aspects of markets with production. We first define the notion of separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) production...

Abstract The Debreu–Farrell measure of technical efficiency is widely used to benchmark firm performance. A limitation this that it orientation restricted and evaluates the performance a decision-making unit in an explicit direction relative best-practice frontier not most productive point on frontier. Therefore, does provide policy insight how direct units achieve best possible productivity le...

Besides sunk costs and reputation, long-term contracts are an important form of commitment. In fact, in the imaginary world of Arrow-Debreu there is no room for other forms of commitment than the fully contingent longterm contract. At the risk of oversimplification, one could describe a large part of the theoretical research effort of the past three decades as a systematic attempt at understand...

The abstract economy defined by Debreu (1952) generalizes the Nash non-cooperative game in that a player’s strategy set depends on the strategy choices of all the other players. Debreu (1952) proved the existence of equilibrium in abstract economies with finitely many agents, finite dimensional strategy space, and quasi-concave utility functions. Since then, the Debreu’s result has been extende...