We analyze the financial leverage of firms that collude to soften product market competition by forming a cartel. find cartel have lower during collusion periods. This is consistent with idea strategically reduce make their cartels more stable, because high makes deviations from agreement attractive. Given large economic footprint, study also relevant for capital structure literature, which has...

We study the secrecy capacity in the vicinity of colluding eavesdroppers. Contrary to the perfect collusion assumption in previous works, our new information-theoretic model considers constraints in collusion. We derive the achievable secure rates (lower bounds on the perfect secrecy capacity), both for the discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. We also compare the proposed rates to the non...

Polluting civil construction enterprises usually use the way of "voting with their feet" to exert influence on efforts local government's environmental regulation, promote formation collusion between government and enterprises, make relax supervision emission behavior enterprises. Based Tibert model, this paper uses evolutionary game method study in cross regional migration its prevention. The ...

increasing overall liberalization and improving reliability indexes are the two prime but often conflicting objectives of electricity markets. proper embedding of regulatory intervention of price caps provides an effective means to tradeoff between these two objectives. surprisingly, in the context of the infinitely repeated game paradigm, as in the case of actual electricity markets, the domin...

This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded owner contributing to solution, instance, solving or inviting others solve it. The mechanism determines and motivates all propagate report their truthfully. particular, cannot exceed budget set owner. However, our imp...