JOHN E. COONS, WILLIAM H. CLUNE 111 U STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN Mr. Coons and Mr. Sugarman are professors of law at the University o f California and coauthors of Private Wealth and Public Education (Harvard University Press); borh appeared in and argued the Serrano case before the California Supreme Court which adopted their position. Mr. Clune teaches law at Wisconsin; he and Mr. Sugarman are form...

We implement one-out-of-two bit oblivious transfer (OT) based on the assumptions used in the McEliece cryptosystem: the hardness of decoding random binary linear codes, and the difficulty of distinguishing a permuted generating matrix of Goppa codes from a random matrix. To our knowledge this is the first OT reduction to these problems only. We present two different constructions for oblivious ...

We consider k-uniform set systems over a universe of size n such that the size of each pairwise intersection of sets lies in one of s residue classes mod q, but k does not lie in any of these s classes. A celebrated theorem of Frankl and Wilson [8] states that any such set system has size at most n s when q is prime. In a remarkable recent paper, Grolmusz [9] constructed set systems of superpol...

In these notes I define and explore some implications of complementarities between choices and complementarities between characteristics for a group of individuals. Complementarity is a fundamental concept in the social interactions literature because it characterizes how the attributes of one individual affect others. An important distinction will turn out to involve the way that one person is...

This paper presents a new class of interactive image editing operations designed to maintain consistency between multiple images of a physical 3D scene. The distinguishing feature of these operations is that edits to any one image propagate automatically to all other images as if the (unknown) 3D scene had itself been modified. The modified scene can then be viewed interactively from any other ...

We argue that quadratic pricing of votes on collective decisions is analogous to linear pricing of private goods and thus solves the tyranny of majority created by the one-person-onevote rule. To do so we propose a solution concept for costly voting models where individuals take the price of influence in units of votes as given. Under this concept, quadratic pricing of votes is the only rule th...