We develop a general theory for the emergence of minority governments in multiparty parliamentary systems using a bargaining model in the tradition of Baron and Ferejohn, 1989. We show that generically (i.e. except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of the model’s parameters) minority governments form with strictly positive probability when office utility from cabinet positions is ...

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect B...

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a “double stable” matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable c...

We present a dynamic model of trading under adverse selection. A seller faces a sequence of randomly arriving buyers. Each buyer receives a noisy signal about the quality of the asset and offers a price. We show that there is generically a unique equilibrium and characterize the resulting trading dynamics. Buyers’ beliefs about the quality of the asset gradually increase or decrease over time, ...

This contribution deals with the fundamental critique in Dinar et al. (1992, Theory and Decision 32) on the use of Game theory in water management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic solutions impose a computational burden. For the bilateral alternating-o¤ers model, a single optimization program signi…cantly reduces the computational burden. ...

The behaviour of subjects in ultimatum bargaining experiments is very different from that predicted by standard theory. These ‘anomalies’ are frequently explained by fairness considerations. In this paper we consider the possibility that the subjects are simply envious. We derive the implications of envy for the behaviour in ultimatum games and it will be shown that envy is a potential explanat...

The objective of this paper is to give the prospective outcome or "prospect" of a negotiation when the players’ value can only be realized if a certain threshold is reached. Thresholds can be of different forms such as a certain number of players, a certain coalition of players or a certain total level of contribution. A value is proposed, which is defined for a given game and a given threshold...

Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches ...

The first part of this paper shows that in a noncooperative bargaining model with alternating offers and time preferences the timing of issues (the agenda) matters even if players become arbitrarily patient. This result raises the question of which agenda should come up endogenously when agents bargain over a set of unrelated issues. It is found that simultaneous bargaining over “packages” shou...

The optical excitations in C70 and higher fullerenes, including isomers of C76, C78, and C84, are theoretically investigated. We use a tight binding model with long-range Coulomb interactions, treated by the Hartree-Fock and configuration-interaction methods. We find that the optical excitations in the energy region smaller than about 4 eV have most of their amplitudes at the pentagons. The osc...