In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shap...

In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. We introduce a new axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations, so that the nonwelfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can ...

1. Introduction This paper discusses some theoretical implications of recasting parsing and semantic interpretation as a type of inference process which we call incrementalhescription refinement.* It draws upon our recent experience with RUS. a framework for natural language processing developed at BBN and in use in several different natural language systems across the country (for details see ...

This paper analyzes Harsanyi power solutions for cooperative games in which partial cooperation is based on union stable systems. These structures contain as particular cases the widely studied communication graph games and permission structures, among others. In this context, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions which distribute the Harsanyi dividends proporti...

We consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents. Recent research introduced a promising mechanism, the probabilistic serial that has superior e¢ ciency properties than the most common real-life mechanism random priroity. On the other hand, mechanisms based on Gale’s celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature (with th...

This paper partially extends the f -core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) for continuum economies with widespread externalities — i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control. Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free disposal of divisible goods nor monotone preferences are assumed. Instead, a slightly strengthened for...

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying sever...

By generalizing the standard solution for 2-person games into n-person cases, this paper develops a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. We characterize the consensus value as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, symmetry, the quasi dummy property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. By defining the stand...

Using a bi-choice graph technique (Klaus and Klijn, 2009), we show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenster...

A well known and simple game to model markets is the glove game where worth is produced by building matching pairs. For glove games, diff erent concepts, like the Shapley value, the restricted Shapley value or the Owen value, yield diff erent distributions of worth. Moreover, computational eff ort of these values is in general very high. This paper provides effi cient allocation formulas of the...