This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most natural bargaining protocol,...

Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos proved a sharp algorithmic characterization of such outcomes, but left open the problem of how the actual bargaining process converges to them. A partial answer w...

In many real-life situations, we need to bargain. What is the best bargaining strategy? If you are already in a negotiating process, your previous offer was a, the seller’s last offer was a > a, what next offer a should you make? A usual commonsense recommendation is to “split the difference”, i.e., to offer a = (a+a)/2, or, more generally, to offer a linear combination a = k · a+ (1− k) · a (f...

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, and such that the payoffs of the players depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm to find all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and...

Search models of monetary exchange have typically relied on Nash (1950) bargaining, or strategic games that yield an equivalent outcome, to determine the terms of trade. By considering alternative axiomatic bargaining solutions in a simple search model with divisible money, we show how this choice matters for important results such as the ability of the optimal monetary policy to generate an ef...

Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results ...

I give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payo¤ sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend th...

In container-based datacenters, failure-prone components are sealed in pre-packaged shipping containers, and component failures over time reduce the availability of resources. From the perspective of services, application instances can usually be migrated across the boundary of containers as virtual machines (VMs). In such an environment, it would be sometimes beneficial to migrate application ...

Previous studies have shown that simply knowing one player moves first can affect behavior in games, even when the first-mover’s moves are known to be unobservable. This observation violates the game-theoretic principle that timing of unobserved moves is irrelevant, but is consistent with virtual observability, a theory of how timing can matter without the ability to observe actions. However, t...

We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players’ payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Hörner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and impor...