rational functions are of great interest to engineers and geoscientists. the rational polynomial coefficient (rpc) model as a generalized sensor model has been introduced as an alternative for the rigorous sensor model of the satellite imaging. numerical instability of normal equations is the only single obstacle to the implementation of these functions. practically, estimating rational functio...

Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice: Sequential Rationalizability and Rational Shortlist Methods A sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function which can be obtained by applying sequentially a fixed set of asymmetric binary relations (rationales). A Rational ShortlistMethod (RSM) is a choice function which is sequentially rationalizable by two rationales. These concepts ...

Economists have heralded the formulation of the expected utility theorem as a universal method of choice under uncertainty. In their seminal paper, Stigler and Becker (Stigler & Becker, 1977) declared that “human behavior can be explained by a generalized calculus of utility-maximizing behavior” (p.76). The universality of the rational choice theory has been widely criticized by psychologists, ...

We answer a question asked by Hajdu and Tengely: The only arithmetic progression in coprime integers of the form (a, b, c, d) is (1, 1, 1, 1). For the proof, we first reduce the problem to that of determining the sets of rational points on three specific hyperelliptic curves of genus 4. A 2-cover descent computation shows that there are no rational points on two of these curves. We find generat...

Abstract The current article provides a review and auto-ethnographic account of the application Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) in police setting. After reviewing literature that explores both REBT policing to date, focus will then turn reflection personal experiences applying principles theory context policing. This commentary highlight broad applicability across many challenging fac...

In settings of incomplete information we put forward an epistemic framework for designing mechanisms that successfully leverage the players’ arbitrary higher-order beliefs, even when such beliefs are totally wrong, and even when the players are rational in a very weak sense. Following Aumann [5], we consider a player i rational if he uses a pure strategy si such that no alternative pure strateg...