Abstract. We study Merton’s classical portfolio optimization problem for an investor who can trade in a risk-free bond and a stock. The goal of the investor is to allocate money so that her expected utility from terminal wealth is maximized. The special feature of the problem studied in this paper is the inclusion of stochastic volatility in the dynamics of the risky asset. The model we use is ...

We consider the problem of maximizing expected utility for a power investor who can allocate his wealth in a stock, a defaultable security, and a money market account. The dynamics of these security prices are governed by geometric Brownian motions modulated by a hidden continuous time finite state Markov chain. We reduce the partially observed stochastic control problem to a complete observati...

This paper analyzes an agent’s option exercise decision under uncertainty. The agent decides whether and when to do an irreversible activity. He is tempted by immediate gratification and suffers from self-control problems. This paper adopts the Gul and Pensendorfer selfcontrol utility model. Unlike the time inconsistent hyperbolic discounting model, it provides an explanation of procrastination...

This paper analyzes hedge fund investors’ geographical preference and its implication for hedge fund performance. We document that funds of funds overweigh their investments in hedge funds located in the same cities by 6 to 15 percent. We also find that funds of funds with a stronger local bias exhibit superior performance. However, this local bias of funds of funds can adversely impact the hed...

This paper analyzes the evolution of agency theory and shows how Austrian economists and, in particular, Mises largely anticipated these developments. Our analytical framework is the evolution of agency theory and we argue that it is a quest for more realism that has been the driving force of this evolution. We analyze how the agency literature has evolved since its first developments with the ...

This paper analyzes the role of yardstick competition for improving political decisions. We examine how performance comparisons across jurisdictions affect the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We study two forms of inefficiency: the provision of wasteful project and the failure to provide useful project .We find a...

We consider a complete financial market with deterministic parameters where an investor and a fund manager have mean-variance preferences. The investor is allowed to borrow with risk-free rate and dynamically allocate his wealth in the fund provided his holdings stay nonnegative. The manager gets proportional fees instantaneously for her management services. We show that the manager can elimina...

We empirically investigate the effects of the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in October 2000. This rule was intended to stop the practice of “selective disclosure,” in which companies give material information only to a few analysts and institutional investors prior to disclosing it publicly. We find that the adoption of Reg FD c...