Strictly competitive games are a class of 2-player games often quoted in the literature to be a proper generalization of zero-sum games. Other times it is claimed, e.g. by Aumann, that strictly competitive games are only payoff transformations of zero-sum games. But to the best of our knowledge there is no proof of such claim. We shed light to this point of confusion in the literature, showing ...

Classes of two-person zero-sum games termed "equivalent games" are defined. These are games with identical value and identical optimal mixed-strategies but with different matrix entries and thus different opportunities for exploiting a nonrational opponent. An experiment was conducted to investigate the strategy-choice behavior of subjects playing pairs of these "equivalent games." Also investi...

Multi-target visual tracking is a challenge because of data association and mutual occlusion in the interacting targets. This paper presents a Gaussian mixture probability hypothesis density based multitarget visual tracking system with game-theoretical occlusion handling. Firstly, the spatial constraint based appearance model with other interacting targets’ interferences is modeled. Then, a tw...

We consider repeated games where the number of repetitions θ is unknown. The information about the uncertain duration can change during the play of the game. This is described by an uncertain duration process that defines the probability law of the signals that players receive at each stage about the duration. To each repeated game and uncertain duration process is associated the -repeated game...

This paper is a continuation of our papers [61 and [71 and is concerned with a continuous time Markov game in which the state space is countable and the action spaces of player I and player n are compact metric spaces. In the game, the players continuously observe the state of the system and then choose actions. As a result, the reward is paid to player I from player n and the system moves to a...

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient outcome among the many individually rational possibilities in a strategic game, and (2) establishing a ...

This paper deals with a multi-stage two-person zero-sum game called the multi-stage search allocation game (MSSAG), in which a searcher and an evader participate. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a discrete search space to detect the evader, while the evader moves under an energy constraint to evade the searcher. At each stage of the search, the searcher is informed of the ev...

We first characterize a two-person, zero-sum game. 1. There are two players, P1 and P2. 2. P1 has a set A = {a1, a2, . . . , am} of m pure strategies (actions). 3. P2 has a set B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} of n pure strategies (actions). 4. Each player has a utility for each (ai, bj) pair of actions. The utility for P1 is denoted U1(ai, bj) and the utility for P2 is denoted U2(ai, bj). Since this i...

In this paper we consider a non-cooperative two-person zero-sum matrix game, called dice game. In an (n, σ) dice game, two players can independently choose a dice from a collection of hypothetical dice having n faces and with a total of σ eyes distributed over these faces. They independently roll their dice and the player showing the highest number of eyes wins (in case of a tie, none of the pl...

The effectiveness of a robot manipulation to a large extent is determined by the speed of making this or that movement needed for carrying out the task. Accordingly to this the problem of optimal robot control is often subdivided into two subproblems solved separately. In an autonomous regime the trajectory planning is fulfilled for providing the robot movement time close to the minimal. The pr...