We have seen that Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games (and generalizations thereof) are polynomial-time tractable from a centralized computation perspective. We have also seen that the payoff matrix of a zero-sum game determines a unique value for the row player and a unique value for the column player (summing to zero), which specify their payoffs in all equilibria of the game. In thi...

Two players engage in a repeated game with incomplete information on one side, where the underlying stage-games are zero-sum. In the case where players evaluate their stage-payoffs by using different discount factors, the payoffs of the infinitely repeated game are typically non zero-sum. However, if players grow infinitely patient, then the equilibrium payoffs will sometimes approach the zero-...

In this paper, we consider an interval matrix game with interval valued payoffs, which is the generation of the traditional matrix game. The “saddle-points”of this interval matrix game are defined and characterized as equilibrium points of corresponding non-zero sum parametric games. Numerical examples are given to illustrate our idea. These results are extended to the fuzzy matrix games. Also,...

This article investigates the impact of confirmation bias on competitive information spread in social network that comprises individuals a and sources at cyber layer. We formulate problem as zero-sum game, which admits unique Nash equilibrium pure strategies. characterize dependence public's innate opinions, topology, well parameters bias. uncover moves toward center only when opinions are not ...

Vehicle routing problem is one of the most important issues in transportation. Among VRP problems, the competitive VRP is more important because there is a tough competition between distributors and retailers. In this study we introduced new method for VRP in competitive environment. In these methods Two-Person Nonzero Sum games are defined to choose equilibrium solution. Therefore, revenue giv...

In the ultimatum game (UG), two players are involved to bargain over a division of a given sum of money. The proposer makes an ultimatum offer of a fraction of money, while the responder can either accept or reject the proposer's decision. In case of rejection of the proposed splitting by the responder, neither player gets anything. Adverse psychological reactions are deemed to play a role in t...

We investigate the behavior of two users and one jammer in an AWGN channel with and without fading when they participate in a non-cooperative zero-sum game, with the channel’s input/output mutual information as the objective function. We assume that the jammer can eavesdrop the channel and can use the information obtained to perform correlated jamming. Under various assumptions on the channel c...