The use of random permutation tables as a side-channel attack countermeasure was recently proposed by Coron [6]. The countermeasure operates by ensuring that during the execution of an algorithm, each intermediate variable that is handled is in a permuted form described by the random permutation tables. In this paper, we examine the application of this countermeasure to the AES algorithm as des...

Over the last several years, side-channel analysis has emerged as a major threat to securing sensitive information in hardware and systems. The list of side-channels that have been (re)discovered include timing [8] micro-architectural anomalies [1, 5, 12, 13], power consumption [9], electromagnetic emanations [2, 7, 14], optical [10, 11] and acoustic leakage [4]. These side-channels have been u...

Thirteen repetitions of a cross-channel transect in the Khuran Channel within the Strait of Hormuz allowed the description of the mean flow and semidiurnal tidal properties of a north-south transect. Water velocity profiles were obtained with a 614.4 kHz TRDI Work Horse Broadband ADCP along this 3.3 km long transect on 10 October 2014, the third day of secondary spring tide. The M2, M4 and M6 f...

Thirteen repetitions of a cross-channel transect in the Khuran Channel within the Strait of Hormuz allowed the description of the mean flow and semidiurnal tidal properties of a northsouth transect. Water velocity profiles were obtained with a 614.4 kHz TRDI Work Horse Broadband ADCP along this 3.3 km long transect on 10 October 2014, the third day of secondary spring tide. The M2, M4 and M6 fr...

In this paper, we consider a recently introduced framework that investigates physically observable implementations from a theoretical point of view. The model allows quantifying the effect of practically relevant leakage functions with a combination of security and information theoretic metrics. More specifically, we apply our evaluation methodology to an exemplary block cipher. We first consid...

This paper presents a new powerful side-channel cryptanalytic method algebraic collision attacks representing an efficient class of power analysis being based on both the power consumption information leakage and specific structure of the attacked cryptographic algorithm. This can result in an extremely low measurement count needed for a key recovery. The algebraic collision attacks are well ap...

Side-channel techniques have well progressed over the last few years, leading to the creation of a variety of statistical tools for extracting the secrets used in cryptographic algorithms. Such techniques are taking advantage of the side-channel traces collected during the executions of secret computations in the product. Noticeably, the vast majority of side-channel attacks requires the traces...

Side-channel attacks are an important class of attacks against cryptographic devices and profiled side-channel attacks are the most powerful type of side-channel attacks. In this scenario, an adversary first uses a device under his control in order to build a good leakage model. Then, he takes advantage of this leakage model to exploit the actual leakages of a similar target device and perform ...