Oblivious RAM (ORAM) garbles read/write operations by a client (to access a remote storage server or a random-access memory) so that an adversary observing the garbled access sequence cannot infer any information about the original operations, other than their overall number. This paper considers the natural setting of Oblivious Parallel RAM (OPRAM) recently introduced by Boyle, Chung, and Pass...

We demonstrate a simple, statistically secure, ORAM with computational overhead Õ(log n); previous ORAM protocols achieve only computational security (under computational assumptions) or require Ω̃(log n) overheard. An additional benefit of our ORAM is its conceptual simplicity, which makes it easy to implement in both software and (commercially available) hardware. Our construction is based on ...

It has been an open question whether Oblivious RAM stored on a malicious server can be securely shared among multiple users. ORAMs are stateful, and users need to exchange updated state to maintain security. This is a challenge, as the motivation for using ORAM is that the users may not have a way to directly communicate. A malicious server can potentially tamper with state information and thus...

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a powerful cryptographic building block that allows a program to provably hide its access patterns to sensitive data. Since the original proposal of ORAM by Goldreich and Ostrovsky, numerous improvements have been made. To date, the best asymptotic overhead achievable for general block sizes is O(logN/ log logN), due to an elegant scheme by Kushilevitz et al., which in t...

Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a trusted CPU to securely access untrusted memory, such that the access patterns reveal nothing about sensitive data. ORAM is known to have broad applications in secure processor design and secure multi-party computation for big data. Unfortunately, due to a well-known logarithmic lower bound by Goldreich and Ostrovsky (Journal of th...

We demonstrate a simple, statistically secure, ORAM with computational overhead Õ(log n); previous ORAM protocols achieve only computational security (under computational assumptions) or require Ω̃(log n) overheard. An additional benefit of our ORAM is its conceptual simplicity, which makes it easy to implement in both software and (commercially available) hardware. Our construction is based on ...